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The Child Quasi Witness
Richard D. Friedmant & Stephen J. Cecift
This Essay provides a solution to the conundrum of statements made by very
young children and offered against an accused in a criminal prosecution. Currently
prevailing doctrine allows one of three basic outcomes. First, in some cases the child
testifies at trial. But this is not always feasible, and when it is, cross-examination is
a poor method for determining the truth. Second, evidence of the child's statement
may be excluded, which denies the adjudicative process of potentially valuable in-
formation. Third, the evidence may be admitted without the child testifying at trial,
which leaves the accused with no practical ability to examine the child.
We contend that courts should apply a very different framework. Some very
young children lack the cognitive and perhaps moral development necessary to be
considered witnesses for purposes of the Confrontation Clause; they are unable to
understand the potential consequences of their statements and the significance of
those statements. Accordingly, the Confrontation Clause should not apply to very
young children's statements. But a child who makes such a statement is still the
source of evidence, often very probative evidence. Fundamental fairness therefore
requires that the accused have the opportunity to examine the child in some man-
ner. Such examination should not be cross-examination at trial. Rather, it should
adhere to the model used for nonhuman sources of evidence: the accused should be
able to select a qualified forensic interviewer, who will examine the child out of
court according to a prescribed protocol. In this Essay, we outline standards that
such a protocol might provide. This model allows evidentiary use of the child's
statement, gives the accused a better opportunity than does cross-examination to ex-
pose weaknesses in the child's account, and minimizes trauma to the child.
INTRODUCTION
Preschool teachers noticed that L.P., a boy not quite three-
and-a-half years old, had facial bruises and a bloodshot eye. In
response to repeated questioning-"Who did this? What hap-
pened to you?"-he ultimately said that "Dee" (Darius Clark, his
mother's boyfriend) had done it.1 Clark was eventually charged
with several counts of child abuse. The trial court deemed L.P.
incompetent to be a trial witness, but it allowed evidence of his
out-of-court statement identifying Clark. The jury found Clark
t Alene and Allan F. Smith Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
Many thanks to Sean Stiff for extremely valuable research assistance.
ft Helen L. Carr Professor of Developmental Psychology, Cornell University.
1 State v Clark, 999 NE2d 592, 595 (Ohio 2013), cert granted, 135 S Ct 43 (2014).
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guilty, but both the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Su-
preme Court held that admission of L.P.'s statement violated
Clark's right under the Sixth Amendment to "be confronted with
the witnesses against him."2
This case reflects a sadly recurrent pattern: a very young
child makes a statement to some authority figure describing
criminal activity-often, but not necessarily, physical or sexual
abuse inflicted on the child. If an adult had made the statement
in similar circumstances, she would understand its gravity and
the likely consequence that the information provided would be
used in a prosecution of the person whom she described as hav-
ing committed a crime. Accordingly, under a sound application
of the US Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v Washington3
the adult's statement should be considered testimonial for pur-
poses of the Confrontation Clause, and it could not be admitted
against an accused unless he had an opportunity to be confront-
ed with her and cross-examine her, at trial if reasonably possi-
ble.4 But does it make sense to treat the situation the same
when the speaker is a very young child who may not appreciate
the gravity and likely consequences of her statement?
For more than a decade after Crawford transformed the law
governing the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme Court de-
clined to take a case that would help clarify how Crawford ap-
plies when the speaker is a child. But now the Court has grant-
ed certiorari in Ohio v Clark,s which presumably means that the
Court will soon address the conundrum of how to apply
Crawford to children. It seems to make little sense to hold that a
young child's statement should be deemed testimonial, and
therefore subject to confrontation, because an adult in the posi-
tion of the child would have understood the likely prosecutorial
consequences of the statement. On the other hand, to hold that
the accused lacks the confrontation right because of relative de-
ficiencies on the speaker's part may seem utterly bizarre and
wrongheaded.
We contend in this Essay that some very young children
should be treated very differently from adults for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause. Our basic thesis may be summarized
2 Id at 601, citing US Const Amend VI.
3 541 US 36 (2004).
4 See id at 59. See also Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts, 557 US 305, 310-11
(2009).
5 Cert granted, 135 S Ct 43 (2014).
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briefly. To be deemed a witness for purposes of the Confronta-
tion Clause requires that the speaker be capable of making a
testimonial statement. That capacity includes at least a cogni-
tive component: the speaker must recognize that her statement
may cause serious adverse consequences for another person and
that others regard her as having an obligation to speak accu-
rately. The capacity to be a witness may also include a moral
component: testifying in a criminal prosecution is an ordeal (and
properly so) and it may be that, as a society, we do not wish to
impose this ordeal on very young children. Whatever the capaci-
ties required for a person to be a witness for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause, we contend that some very young children
lack them. As a consequence, out-of-court statements by such
children, even statements made to authority figures and describ-
ing criminal activity, do not fall within the strictures of the
Clause. At the same time, even very young children may be
sources of evidence-in some cases quite good evidence-that
our judicial system ought to be able to use. But if a child is
deemed incapable of being a witness for purposes of the Con-
frontation Clause, either at the time of her statement or at the
time of trial, then the usual method that our system offers par-
ties for testing adverse statements made by a human observer-
cross-examination under oath at trial or in some other formal
proceeding-is inappropriate. Rather, an accused should be able
to have a qualified expert examine the child in an informal, out-
of-court setting, subject to a prescribed, scientifically validated
protocol.
Hence, we speak of some children as "quasi witnesses"-
lacking the capacity to be witnesses and so not subject to con-
frontation, but nevertheless potentially valuable sources of evi-
dence and so subject to a different form of examination.
We believe it is rather obvious that, properly administered,
an alternative procedure of the type that we propose tends to
burden and traumatize a very young child less than a system in
which she is expected to testify at trial, perhaps in open court in
the presence of the accused, and face cross-examination by his
lawyer. Relatedly, we also argue that the proposed procedure
both reduces the likelihood that a young child will recant accu-
rate statements that she previously made and increases the
probability that she will recant prior inaccurate statements.
Thus, we contend that this procedure also gives the accused a
better opportunity to reveal defects in the child's cognitive
2015]1 91
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functioning and truth-telling capacities as well as flaws in her
account of the events at issue.
I. THE DOCTRINAL CONUNDRUM
To understand the confrontation right, it is necessary to
recognize that, in providing how witnesses are to give testimony,
a judicial system could choose from a wide range of procedures.
Witnesses could commit their testimony to writing and seal it
before trial, for example, as the ancient Athenians did, or they
could testify behind closed doors to a court official, as was the
norm in the old continental courts.6 But Crawford held that the
Confrontation Clause requires that witnesses against an ac-
cused testify in the manner that has been prescribed for centu-
ries by the common law: under oath, subject to cross-
examination, and, if reasonably possible, at trial.7 Crawford thus
establishes that the Confrontation Clause does not create a sub-
stantive standard for the admissibility of evidence. Rather, the
Clause provides a procedural right governing the manner in
which witnesses testify against an accused.8 That right reaches
statements that are testimonial in nature, wherever made.9 And,
as subsequent cases have made clear, it applies only to such
statements. 0
The Supreme Court has not yet comprehensively prescribed
how to determine whether a statement is testimonial. But in
Michigan v Bryant" the Court indicated that, in the context of
an interrogation, the test is whether the "primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially rel-
evant to later criminal prosecution."12 The Court asserted that
the circumstances must be assessed objectively: "[T]he relevant
inquiry is not the subjective or actual purpose of the individuals
involved in a particular encounter, but rather the purpose that
reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the
individuals' statements and actions and the circumstances in
6 See Douglas M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens 242-43 (Cornell 1978);
Richard D. Friedman, 'Face to Face: Rediscovering the Right to Confront Prosecution
Witnesses, 8 Intl J Evid & Proof 1, 8 (2004).
7 Crawford, 541 US at 53-54, 68-69.
8 See id at 61.
9 Id at 68-69.
10 See, for example, Whorton v Bockting, 549 US 406, 420 (2007); Davis v Washing-
ton, 547 US 813, 823-26 (2006).
11 131 S Ct 1143 (2011).
12 Id at 1154, quoting Davis, 547 US at 822.
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which the encounter occurred."3 Bryant further indicates that
the perspectives of both the speaker and the questioner must be
taken into account.14 Ultimately, because it is the speaker who is
or is not deemed to be a witness for purposes of the Confronta-
tion Clause, we believe that the best interpretation of Bryant is
that (1) the intent of a reasonable person in the speaker's posi-
tion16 is the determining factor as to whether a statement is tes-
timonial, but (2) crucial factors in discerning that intent are
what that reasonable person would understand to be the ques-
tioner's purpose in conducting the conversation and the
questioner's likely conduct in response to the conversation.
But how is this standard to be applied in the case of chil-
dren? Courts could apply it straightforwardly and ask, as in the
case of an adult speaker, what the understanding of a reasona-
ble person would be.16 The use of a reasonable person standard,
after all, is meant to avoid the need for determining the mental
state of the particular speaker at the time of the statement. An
objective test of this sort necessarily does not match perfectly
with reality: the understanding of the posited reasonable person
will be less insightful than that of some people and more insight-
ful than that of others, but we accept the divergence for the sake
of clarity and simplicity. The same principle could be applied to
speakers of all ages. But to ignore the child's age requires the
court to engage in a rather bizarre inquiry, asking about the un-
derstanding that a reasonable adult would have if that adult
were in the position of the child speaker-which would be essen-
tially impossible, given that the cognitive distributions of adults
and preschoolers are largely nonoverlapping. It is at least
somewhat strange to treat the statement of a very young child
as testimonial on the basis that a reasonable adult would antici-
pate prosecutorial use of the statement, even if in fact the child
could not plausibly have such an anticipation.
Alternatively, a court might take the child's age into ac-
count. Rather than ask what the understanding of a reasonable
person in L.P.'s position would have been, for example, one
might ask what the understanding of a child of L.P.'s age, and of
13 Bryant, 131 S Ct at 1156.
14 Id at 1160.
15 We use "intent" here as a shorthand; in fact, we believe that if a reasonable per-
son in the position of the speaker would anticipate likely evidentiary use of the state-
ment, then that would also be sufficient to make the statement testimonial.
16 See, for example, State v Snowden, 867 A2d 314, 325 (Md App 2005); People v
Sisavath, 118 Cal App 4th 1396, 1402 n 3 (Cal App 2004).
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ordinary development, would have been. One could thus ask
what the understanding of a three-year-old of ordinary develop-
ment would be. (It does not make sense to ask what a reasonable
three-year-old would understand because-as parents know-
"reasonable three-year-old" is an oxymoron.)"
Such a standard has its own problems. It creates a messy
fragmentation of the law-in determining whether a statement
is testimonial, continuous age adjustment is used for children up
to some presumed age of maturity and then abandoned in favor
of a uniform approach based on the one-type-fits-all posited rea-
sonable person for adults.18 A more substantive concern is that
this age-adjusted standard creates what at first appears to be a
rather bizarre anomaly-that the child's relative cognitive
weakness, by taking the statement outside the scope of the Con-
frontation Clause, results in less protection for the accused.
Our approach steers an alternative course, allowing the
admission of a young child's statement under a procedure that is
very different from testimony at trial. We do believe that the law
should take into account the child's age-meaning that, under
our approach, as under the age-adjustment approach for deter-
mining whether a statement is testimonial, there are some cir-
cumstances in which a child's statement will fall outside the
Confrontation Clause even though a statement by an adult in
similar circumstances would fall within it. But the approach
that we propose here avoids the anomaly of the age-adjustment
approach by first posing a different question: before asking
whether a statement was testimonial, the court should ask
whether the child is capable of being a witness for the purposes
of the Clause. The consequences of a negative answer are very
different for each of the two questions. When a court decides
that a given statement is not testimonial, the result is simply
17 But see, for example, State v Scacchetti, 690 NW2d 393, 396 (Minn App 2005)
(asking whether "the circumstances surrounding the contested statements led the three-
year-old to reasonably believe her disclosures would be available for use at a later trial,
or that the circumstances would lead a reasonable child of her age to have that expecta-
tion"); People v Vigil, 127 P3d 916, 925 (Colo 2006):
[A]n assessment of whether or not a reasonable person in the position of the
declarant would believe a statement would be available for use at a later trial
involves an analysis of the expectations of a reasonable person in the position
of the declarant. Expectations derive from circumstances, and, among other
circumstances, a person's age is a pertinent characteristic for analysis.
18 The Supreme Court has, however, adopted a similar approach in the Miranda
context. See J.D.B. v North Carolina, 131 S Ct 2394, 2408 (2011) (holding that a child's
age can be relevant in determining whether a suspect has been taken into custody).
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that the Clause does not apply and therefore poses no obstacle to
admission of the statement. But a decision under our approach
that the child is incapable of being a witness would trigger an
altogether different procedure, assuring that ordinarily the
statement could not be admitted unless the accused is accorded
substantial rights that are more appropriate than cross-
examination for dealing with a very young child.
II. THE CAPACITY TO BE A WITNESS
When a statement by an adult is at issue, it is not ordinarily
necessary to ask whether the speaker is capable of being a wit-
ness for purposes of the Confrontation Clause; the court need
only ask whether the particular statement is testimonial in na-
ture. But when the speaker is a child, the court ought to ask
first the logically prior question: Does the child have sufficient
capacity to be deemed a witness for purposes of the Confronta-
tion Clause?
We will elaborate in Part III on what the consequences
should be if the answer to this question is negative. For now we
will consider the question of what is required for a person to be a
witness and discuss the reasons why some very young children
ought to be deemed to lack the requisite capacity. It is important
to bear in mind two points throughout this discussion: First, the
question here is what it means to be a witness-that is, to speak
testimonially-not what the requirements are for being a good
or acceptable witness. Thus, to be a witness, it is not necessary
that the person herself regard it as important that she tell the
truth or that she have a good memory; there are, after all, wit-
nesses who lie or otherwise speak inaccurately. Second, the tes-
timonial act that may make a person a witness for purposes of
the Confrontation Clause, and so invoke the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause, may occur out of court. Our focus in this
Essay is on the out-of-court context.
The Supreme Court has defined "testimony" as "[a] solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing
or proving some fact."19 For a person to be a witness under this
definition, it is necessary first that she be able to provide a co-
herent statement for the purpose of "establishing or proving
some fact."20 And second, it is necessary that she be capable of
19 Bryant, 131 S Ct at 1153, quoting Crawford, 541 US at 51.
20 Crawford, 541 US at 51.
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solemnity.21 In this context, solemnity is best understood to refer
not to the manner in which the statement is made but rather to
an appreciation of the gravity of the declaration-that is, of the
potential consequences that it might have and of their
significance.
In other words, in order to be capable of giving testimony, a
person must be able to recognize and understand the truth of
the propositions in the following causal chain:
As a result of my statement, my listeners may believe that
what I say happened did in fact happen; as a result of that
belief they may take action; and as an ultimate result of
that action, the person whose conduct I am describing may
suffer serious adverse consequences. Accordingly, my listen-
ers, or others, regard it as important that I speak truthfully.
Adults of ordinary intelligence have the capacity to recognize
this chain of causation, though it involves comprehending the
perceptions, understandings, desires, and reactions of others, in-
cluding people not part of the immediate conversation. Very
young children do not have that capacity.22
Just which children should be considered to have sufficient
capacity to be deemed a witness is a very complex question. De-
veloping a sound answer requires two distinct steps. One is to
understand a real-world phenomenon: the intricacies of chil-
dren's development of the various competencies necessary to be
capable of the act of witnessing. The second is to choose a stand-
ard for determining when-given that individual children devel-
op differently, and that particular capacities tend to develop
gradually and at different times-a given child or class of chil-
dren should be considered sufficiently developed (cognitively and
perhaps morally) to be deemed capable of being a witness.
Our primary purpose is to establish that some class of chil-
dren should not be considered capable of being witnesses. Once
21 See id.
22 See People v Stechly, 870 NE2d 333, 362 (111 2007), quoting Richard D. Friedman,
The Conundrum of Children, Confrontation, and Hearsay, 65 L & Contemp Probs 243,
251-52 (2002) ("Even statements by very young children may be highly probative. But
very young children are not yet at a stage where they can be expected to take the re-
sponsibility of being a witness."). In addition to the cognitive argument presented here,
there is a moral argument-which we will not analyze further but which we think de-
serves serious consideration-that society should not impose on young children, perhaps
not even until adolescence, the ordeal and responsibility of being a witness. See Sherman
J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the Confrontation Clause, 81 Neb L Rev
1258, 1280-85 (2003).
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one focuses on the nature of witnessing, that proposition should
be clear. An eighteen-month-old child may be capable of making
a statement that appears to describe criminal conduct;23 she does
not, however, have the capacity to be a witness for purposes of
the Confrontation Clause. A fifteen-year-old, on the other hand,
clearly has the capacity, both cognitive and moral, to be a
witness. Where and how should the line between these two poles
be drawn? We offer some thoughts that might help resolve this
question, but we do not attempt to reach a definitive answer
here.
Researchers have amply documented that young children-
particularly those who have not yet reached first grade-are
fundamentally unlike older persons in their social cognitions.
That is, the inferences that young children derive from social
encounters are qualitatively different from those that older per-
sons derive: preschool-aged children fail to understand other
persons' mental states-beliefs, intentions, motives, and de-
sires-and they make errors predicting the consequences of
their statements to such other persons. There is a biological ba-
sis for this deficit: the prefrontal cortex of the developing brain
controls so-called executive functions such as monitoring, plan-
ning, and impulse control.24 Although functional from early in
life, this brain region is not mature until late adolescence.25 Nu-
merous studies reveal the deficits that result in young children's
cognitions as a result of this neural immaturity.26 These deficits
affect a web of interrelated psychological abilities that are
23 See, for example, State v Webb, 779 P2d 1108, 1109 (Utah 1989) (concerning an
eighteen-month-old girl who, after a bath taken shortly after a visit with her father, said
to her mother, "Ow bum daddy").
24 Marilyn C. Welsh, Bruce F. Pennington, and Dena B. Groisser, A Normative-
Developmental Study of Executive Function, 7 Developmental Neuropsychology 131, 131-
32 (1991). See also generally Hiroki R. Hayama and Michael D. Rugg, Right Dorsolateral
Prefrontal Cortex Is Engaged during Post-retrieval Processing of Both Episodic and Se-
mantic Information, 47 Neuropsychologia 2409 (2009).
25 See generally Monica Luciana and Charles A. Nelson, The Functional Emergence
of Prefrontally-Guided Working Memory Systems in Four- to Eight-Year-Old Children, 36
Neuropsychologia 273 (1998); Dima Amso and B.J. Casey, Beyond What Develops When:
Neuroimaging May Inform How Cognition Changes with Development, 15 Current Direc-
tions in Psychological Sci 24 (2006); John R. Best, Patricia H. Miller, and Lara L. Jones,
Executive Functions after Age 5: Changes and Correlates, 29 Developmental Rev 180
(2009).
26 See, for example, Stephen J. Ceci, Stanka A. Fitneva, and Wendy M. Williams,
Representational Constraints on the Development of Memory and Metamemory: A Devel-
opmental-Representational Theory, 117 Psychological Rev 464, 483-84 (2010); Luciana
and Nelson, 36 Neuropsychologia at 285 (cited in note 25); Welsh, Pennington, and
Groisser, 7 Developmental Neuropsychology at 137-41 (cited in note 24).
972015]
The University of Chicago Law Review
involved in understanding the mental states of others as well as
the effects that one's own actions and statements have on
others.
Most adults can simulate the mental states of other peo-
ple-put themselves in others' shoes, in the colloquial phrase-
so that they can predict others' future behavior and the effect of
their own conduct on that behavior.27 Doing so requires that the
person understand that others have thoughts, feelings, and be-
liefs that may differ from her own and that may motivate others'
behavior. Without this understanding-often referred to as "the-
ory of mind" ("ToM")-people would be unable to make sense of
the social world and would be ill-suited for social encounters.28
The term "social understanding" is sometimes used within the
framework of ToM to refer to "the ability to conceptualise
mental states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions and to use
these constructs to interpret and predict the actions of others."29
The various aspects of these abilities have different developmen-
tal trajectories.30 But before age four, very few children exhibit
even rudimentary forms of ToM; by age six, nearly all normally
developing children have acquired these rudiments.3'
Thus, most children under the age of four are unaware that
other people might have false beliefs.32 Indeed, below this age,
most children do not recognize that the information that is
available to them from their observations is not known by other
people; therefore, the basic concept of informing another person,
and adding to that other person's state of knowledge, is foreign
to them. Even well after they gain this recognition, most
27 See Nicholas Epley and David Dunning, Feeling "Holier than Thou": Are Self-
Serving Assessments Produced by Errors in Self- or Social Prediction?, 79 J Personality
& Soc Psychology 861, 872 (2000); Emily Balcetis and David Dunning, Considering the
Situation: Why People Are Better Social Psychologists than Self-Psychologists, 12 Self &
Identity 1, 2 (2013); Richard E. Nisbett and Ziva Kunda, Perception of Social Distribu-
tions, 48 J Personality & Soc Psychology 297, 309 (1985).
28 See Sandra Bosacki and Janet Wilde Astington, Theory of Mind in Preadoles-
cence: Relations between Social Understanding and Social Competence, 8 Soc Develop-
ment 237, 237 (1999) (finding a positive correlation between ToM skills and social
competence).
29 Id at 237-38.
30 See id at 238; Welsh, Pennington, and Groisser, 7 Developmental Neuropsychol-
ogy at 138 (cited in note 24).
31 See Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner, Beliefs about Beliefs: Representation and
Constraining Function of Wrong Beliefs in Young Children's Understanding of Deception,
13 Cognition 103, 104 (1983).
32 See Jeremy Carpendale and Charlie Lewis, How Children Develop Social Under-
standing 24 (Blackwell 2006).
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children lack the ability that adults have to use readily available
information to draw an inference about the mental state of an-
other person.33 Lacking well-developed executive functions,
preschool-aged children are unlikely to be capable of the solem-
nity of recognizing that giving a false account of a past event
may cause their listeners and others to take action that will lead
to unjustified consequences for another person; these children
are likely to say what they believe will please their listeners.34
The many experiments that test the limitations on young
children's ToM are not, of course, set in the forensic context. But
they show in strong terms an inability on the part of very young
children to appreciate the mental states of other persons and to
predict the consequent behavior of those others-and these stud-
ies do so with respect to relatively simple matters. Far more so-
phisticated understanding is necessary for a child to recognize
the mental state of an adult interrogator in the context on which
this Essay focuses-that is, the purpose of the interrogator in
conducting a conversation about a third person's past conduct is
to gather information that may be used against, and perhaps
lead to serious punishment for, that person. The experiments
therefore provide strong evidence that very young children lack
that understanding.
33 Numerous experiments demonstrate this. See, for example, id at 30, citing
Wimmer and Perner, 13 Cognition 103 (cited in 31); Francesca G.E. Happ6, An Advanced
Test of Theory of Mind: Understanding of Story Characters' Thoughts and Feelings by
Able Autistic, Mentally Handicapped, and Normal Children and Adults, 24 J Autism &
Developmental Disorders 129, 137-38 (1994) (describing the differences between adults
and children in performance of ToM tasks); T. Aboulafia-Brakha, et al, Theory of Mind
Tasks and Executive Functions: A Systematic Review of Group Studies in Neurology, 5 J
Neuropsychology 39, 40 (2011) (discussing studies that "support[] the view that [execu-
tive function] is necessary for [ToM] development"). These studies suggest that, before
ages three to six, children have difficulty recognizing that others operate on a base of
information different from their own. See Carpendale and Lewis, Social Understanding
at 53-59 (cited in note 32).
34 See Amelia Courtney Hritz, Lie to Me: Compliant False Accusations by Children
*3-4 (unpublished manuscript, Aug 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/NP5Y-EHVG (de-
scribing an experiment in which fifteen of sixteen young children complied with a re-
quest to knowingly make a false accusation); Rhona H. Flin, Yvonne Stevenson, and
Graham M. Davies, Children's Knowledge of Court Proceedings, 80 Brit J Psychology
285, 294 (1989) (indicating that, of the children studied, few of the eight-year-olds but
most of the ten-year-olds thought that honesty in court is important "because of the risks
of convicting the innocent or releasing the guilty"). Eagerness to please an interrogator
does, of course, require some understanding of the responsive conduct that the interroga-
tor wishes (which may, as in the Hritz study, be expressly stated by the interrogator),
but it does not require any understanding of how the interrogator's underlying desires,
intentions, or beliefs motivate her questions.
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This is especially true because the contemplated punish-
ment involves an intricate series of events-well in the future
and involving many other people not part of the conversation-
that a very young child is not likely to contemplate or under-
stand. Even through age ten, children's very rudimentary com-
prehension of the legal system is unlikely to include familiarity
with the concept of evidence or an understanding of why it is
needed in court.35
III. CHILDREN AS SOURCES OF EVIDENCE
A. Probative Value and Prejudice
Very young children, we have argued, lack the capacities
necessary for their conduct to be deemed witnessing. But this
does not mean that their statements fail to provide useful evi-
dence. On the contrary, the statements of children can be
extremely probative-and this may be true even if the child is
not considered a particularly reliable observer or reporter and
even if she does not understand the intentions of those who in-
terview her.
Evidence that a child has asserted a proposition X can be
significantly probative of X even if (1) it is far less than certain
that the child would assert X if X were true, and (2) it is plausi-
ble that the child would assert X even if it were not true. What
is significant is the likelihood ratio of the two probabilities: the
evidence will tend to prove X if it is more probable that the child
would assert X if X were true than that she would assert X if X
were false. If two probabilities are the same-so that the likeli-
hood ratio is one-the evidence has no probative value. But usu-
ally the likelihood ratio for a child's assertion of a proposition is
far greater than one.
35 See Karen J. Saywitz, Children's Conceptions of the Legal System: "Court Is a
Place to Play Basketball", in Stephen J. Ceci, David F. Ross, and Michael P. Toglia, eds,
Perspectives on Children's Testimony 131, 135 (Springer-Verlag 1989) (reviewing studies
that describe children's lack of familiarity with the courtroom); Flin, Stevenson, and
Davies, Children's Knowledge at 291, 295 (cited in note 34) (noting that six-year-old
study participants did not understand at all the meanings of "evidence" and "witness,"
among other terms); Amye Warren-Leubecker, et al, What Do Children Know about the
Legal System and When Do They Know It? First Steps down a Less Traveled Path in
Child Witness Research, in Ceci, Ross, and Toglia, eds, Perspectives 158, 165-67 (noting
that 18 percent of three-year-old study participants knew what a courtroom is, and few
children under eight years old knew about witnesses).
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We can consider this matter, invoking a standard rubric, by
assessing the capacities of perception, memory, sincerity, and
communication.36 Flaws in any of these capacities can lead to an
inaccurate statement. But children are not random communica-
tors; their capacities usually operate reasonably well. Children's
perception of events within their understanding is good.37
Though very young children are often more vulnerable to sug-
gestion than adults are,38 their memory is reasonably good, even
over an extended period.39 Despite childhood limitations,
memory functions from birth, and it is well developed long be-
fore ToM, which usually does not develop before age four.40 A
child, like an adult, might have a motive that deflects her from a
sincere desire to tell the truth. But young children are less likely
to have such insincere motives than are older persons and tend
to have a less well-developed ability to lie;41 in any event, like
adults, young children are far more likely to intend to communi-
cate a given proposition if it is true than if it is false. And, alt-
hough young children have limited communicative ability, they
are usually able to communicate reasonably well about
36 See Kenneth S. Broun, ed, 2 McCormick on Evidence 178 (Thomson Reuters 7th
ed 2013) (speaking in terms of perception, memory, narration, and sincerity).
37 See Alan Slater and Scott P. Johnson, Visual Sensory and Perceptual Abilities of
the Newborn: Beyond the Blooming, Buzzing Confusion, in Francesca Simion and George
Butterworth, eds, The Development of Sensory, Motor and Cognitive Capacities in Early
Infancy: From Perception to Cognition 121, 138 (Psychology 1998); Elizabeth Spelke, In-
fants'Intermodal Perception of Events, 8 Cognitive Psychology 553, 554 (1976).
38 See generally Stephen J. Ceci and Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of
Children: Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86 Cornell L Rev 33 (2000);
Stephen J. Ceci, David F. Ross, and Michael P. Toglia, Suggestibility of Children's
Memory: Psycholegal Implications, 116 J Experimental Psychology: General 38 (1987).
See also Stephen J. Ceci and Maggie Bruck, Jeopardy in the Courtroom: A Scientific
Analysis of Children's Testimony 233 (American Psychological Association 1995). In most
forensic contexts, suggestibility tends to diminish with age because of older children's
stronger memory traces, better monitoring ability, and lower likelihood of incorporating
interviewers' suggestions into their accounts. See generally Stephen J. Ceci and Maggie
Bruck, Children's Suggestibility: Characteristics and Mechanisms, 34 Advances in Child
Development and Behav 247 (2006).
39 See Ceci and Bruck, Jeopardy in the Courtroom at 235 (cited in note 38). See also
generally Nina R. Hamond and Robyn Fivush, Memories of Mickey Mouse: Young Chil-
dren Recount Their Trip to Disneyworld, 6 Cognitive Development 433 (1991).
40 See David F. Bjorklund, Children's Thinking: Cognitive Development and Indi-
vidual Differences 250-51, 267 (Thomson Wadsworth 4th ed 2005).
41 See Michael Lewis, The Development of Deception, in Michael Lewis and Carolyn
Saarni, eds, Lying and Deception in Everyday Life 90, 92 (Guilford 1993) (indicating that
the ability of children to mask their feelings increases with age); Ceci and Bruck,
Jeopardy in the Courtroom at x (cited in note 38) (noting children's "propensity to speak
forthrightly").
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important aspects of events that they understand;42 they are cer-
tainly more likely to communicate that a given event happened
if it is their intent to do so than if it is not.43
Thus, the probability that, if an event occurred, sound oper-
ation of these capacities would lead the child to state accurately
that the event occurred is usually far greater than the probabil-
ity that, if the event did not occur, unsound operation of one or
more of the capacities would lead the child to state inaccurately
that the event did occur. This is especially true if the child's
statement describes an event-such as ejaculation-with which
the child is presumably (though not inevitably) unfamiliar; in
such a case, one might conclude that, even if the child is not a
particularly accurate reporter, it would be unlikely, if the event
did not occur, that the child would happen to come up with the
description.44
We do not mean to argue that because the child asserts a
proposition it is probably true; how probable the proposition ul-
timately appears will depend not only on that assertion but also
on the prior odds (the odds of the proposition as assessed with-
out the child's assertion), which in turn depend on how plausible
the proposition is at the outset and on the other evidence in the
case. We mean only to claim that, in most cases, the child's as-
sertion is likely to be significantly probative: it will have a like-
lihood ratio far greater than one, so whatever may be the prior
odds of the proposition asserted by the child, it will raise the
odds-in most cases, by a substantial amount.
Furthermore, even assuming that the child does not appear
in court, the potential prejudicial effect of the evidence is very
unlikely to be so great as to outweigh the probative value. Such
prejudice, if it exists, would arise principally from the jury's
overvaluation of the evidence. But one should not jump to the
conclusion that the jury will substantially overvalue such evi-
dence. Some of the defects of the evidence will probably be ap-
parent to the jury; jurors are not likely to believe that because a
42 Hilary Horn Ratner, Brenda S. Smith, and Robert J. Padgett, Children's Organi-
zation of Events and Event Memories, in Robyn Fivush and Judith A. Hudson, eds,
Knowing and Remembering in Young Children 65, 66 (Cambridge 1990).
43 See Richard D. Friedman, Route Analysis of Credibility and Hearsay, 96 Yale L J
667, 681-85 (1987) (analyzing a case in which a child described a stranger's apartment,
where she was allegedly molested).
44 See id.
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very young child made a statement it must be true.45 Expert tes-
timony about the weaknesses of children as observers and re-
porters may further assist the jury, as may commentary by the
court. And substantial further assistance may be provided by
the procedure that we now discuss, involving out-of-court exam-
ination of the child by a qualified expert.
B. Out-of-Court Examination: Selecting the Proper Model
Given that statements by some very young children may be
highly probative evidence that provides crucial assistance to ad-
judicative factfinding-even though the children may be incapa-
ble of acting as witnesses-how should a court deal with those
statements?
Two models are available, each governing a distinct type of
source of evidence. Under both models, the accused has an op-
portunity to examine the source of evidence, at least if it is
available, in an attempt to undermine the inference that the
prosecution seeks to draw from the evidence. But this opportuni-
ty is very different in the two models. Courts and commentators
have assumed that the model for young children is the one gen-
erally governing statements by human beings.46 But we contend
that this is inadequate for children deemed incapable of being
witnesses; instead, courts should apply the model that governs
nonhuman sources of evidence.
When the prosecution offers an adult's statements to prove
the truth of a proposition that she asserted, the prosecution con-
tends that she observed an event or condition and subsequently
reported on it accurately. And the accused attempts to demon-
strate that she may have come to make the statement by some
other path. Adverse questioning conducted under formal condi-
tions-by counsel and, if reasonably possible, at trial-is the
primary method by which the accused can do so. If the state-
ment is testimonial, then the Confrontation Clause applies, and
even if the speaker is unavailable at trial, the statement cannot
be admitted unless the accused has had an opportunity for
45 See Richard D. Friedman, The Mold That Shapes Hearsay Law, 66 Fla L Rev
433, 446 & n 72 (2014) (reviewing empirical literature that suggests that jurors do not
overvalue hearsay).
46 See, for example, State v Snowden, 867 A2d 314, 329 (Md App 2005) (applying
the same Confrontation Clause test to children that is applied to adults); Michael H.
Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecu-
tions: The State of the Relationship, 72 Minn L Rev 523, 530-37 (1988).
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cross-examination.47 Even if the statement is not testimonial,
the rule against hearsay may still require exclusion of the
statement unless either the declarant is brought to trial or the
accused had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. And even
if an exemption to that rule allows the prosecution to present
the statement without producing the declarant, the Compulsory
Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment gives the accused the
option, assuming that the declarant is available, of bringing her
to court and examining her there. Though an accused is some-
times allowed to take depositions for discovery of potential ad-
verse witnesses,8 this is not the usual model: the accused's op-
portunity to examine the maker of the statement ordinarily
occurs at trial, and the Supreme Court has declared that con-
frontation is "basically a trial right."9
Assuming that we are correct that some very young children
are incapable of being witnesses for purposes of the Confronta-
tion Clause, this model offers an inadequate opportunity for ex-
amining them. We believe that this is essentially self-evident if
at the time of trial the child is still incapable of being an ade-
quate witness-and all the more so if she is still incapable of be-
ing a witness at all. But even if, by the time of trial, the child
has become capable of being an adequate witness, we believe
that adverse questioning at that time offers an inadequate op-
portunity for examination with respect to the prior statement:
the child will still presumably be very young, and the accused
would be in a position of having to call the child to the witness
stand to examine her about a statement that she made a consid-
erable time before, concerning an event that occurred some time
before that.0
47 Crawford, 541 US at 59. This simplifies slightly: the accused may have forfeited
the confrontation right, and perhaps there is a dying-declaration exception to the right.
See id at 56 n 6.
48 See, for example, FRCrP 15.
49 Barber v Page, 390 US 719, 725 (1968).
5o Part of the problem is the logical complexity of the task. A cross-examiner aims
to establish, "Now, you've just testified to X. But Y is true. And X and Y are not compati-
ble." In the posited case, the adverse examiner asks the young witness not about some-
thing that she just said, but about a statement (1) that she made at a considerably earli-
er time, when her cognitive capacities were significantly less developed, (2) the precise
contents and context of which are very important, and (3) that concerns an even earlier
incident. Young children, barely competent to be witnesses at all, are unlikely to be able
to give useful answers to such a line of questions. See generally Rachel Zajac and Har-
lene Hayne, I Don't Think That's What Really Happened: The Effect of Cross-
Examination on the Accuracy of Children's Reports, 9 J Experimental Psychology: Ap-
plied 187 (2003). The problem is aggravated by memory loss, which tends to be more
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Now consider the model that applies in the case of nonhu-
man sources of evidence. Suppose, for example, that a prosecutor
presents evidence that the markings on a bullet indicate that it
was fired by a particular gun. The accused wishes to undermine
the inference sought by the prosecution. Perhaps the particular
gun would not always produce the same type of markings, and
perhaps such markings could be produced by a different gun. In
other words, it may be that the likelihood ratio of the evidence is
not as great as the prosecution suggests. Cross-examination of
the gun and the bullet is obviously not a possibility. Instead, the
accused should have the opportunity to examine them out of
court, if feasible.51
Such an examination is not, like cross-examination, a series
of questions posed by an attorney. Rather, it is examination in a
more literal sense-by an expert, chosen by the accused, who is
qualified to inspect the source of the evidence and perhaps con-
duct some experiments on it. The aim of the examination is to
assess the prosecution's contention that a given response by the
source of evidence is a strong indication that it was subjected to
a particular stimulus. The examiner thus attempts to determine
how reliably the source, if subjected to that stimulus, provides
that response, and whether other stimuli might produce the
same response.
The accused's right to conduct such an examination and
present the expert testimony is a rule of preference. That is, it
does not ordinarily preclude the presentation of the prosecu-
tion's evidence if, through no fault of the prosecution,
severe in young children than in older persons, see, for example, Jodi A. Quas, et al, Do
You Really Remember It Happening or Do You Only Remember Being Asked about It
Happening? Children's Source Monitoring in Forensic Contexts, in Kim P. Roberts and
Mark Blades, eds, Children's Source Monitoring 197, 207-08 (Lawrence Erlbaum 2000);
David J. Bjorklund, Children's Thinking: Cognitive Development and Individual Differ-
ences 284 (Wadsworth 4th ed 2005), and by the danger of corruption of memory: "[I]f
children are persistently interviewed, they may actually acquire facts or scripts [under-
standings of recurrent patterns of social behavior] about the alleged event, even if they
had no previous knowledge of this information prior to the series of interviews." Ceci and
Bruck, Jeopardy in the Courtroom at 257 (cited in note 38).
51 See United States v Walker, 66 Milit Just 721, 742-43 (Navy-Marine Corps Ct
Crim App 2008) (noting that federal courts recognize a constitutional right of the accused
to have an expert of his choosing perform independent testing of physical evidence under
appropriate safeguards). See also FRCrP 16(a)(1)(E)(ii) (giving the accused the right to
inspect a tangible object within the government's control that the government intends to
use at trial).
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examination of the source of the evidence becomes impractical.52
In this respect, the examination right under this model is less
comprehensive than the confrontation right. The latter states
the minimum acceptable conditions for a witness to give testi-
mony against an accused. It is the prosecution that must bear
the risk that-assuming no fault on the part of the accused-one
or more of these conditions cannot be satisfied.53 But the ac-
cused's right to examine a nonhuman source of evidence is part
of a generalized right of fairness; if it is feasible to provide the
accused an opportunity to examine the source, then ordinarily it
is unfair to deny him that opportunity, but if there is no such
opportunity, then admission of the evidence does not create
unfairness.
The same model should be applied to the statements of very
young children who are not mature enough to be considered wit-
nesses. The accused should be allowed to select a qualified ex-
pert to examine the child out of court, unless for some reason
this is not feasible..5 The expert would attempt to assess the rel-
ative magnitude of the two components of the likelihood ratio-
the probability that the child would make the statement that
she assertedly did if the event that she reported occurred as she
said, and the probability that she would make the statement if
the event did not occur as she said. The expert could then testify
at trial as to her conclusions.
We will assess the benefits of using this model after present-
ing a fuller picture of how the examination should be conducted.
C. Guidelines for Conducting the Examination
The essence of our proposal does not depend on the particu-
lars of how the examination of the child should be conducted.
But if our proposal were adopted, some protocol would be neces-
sary, and we suggest here a possible set of guidelines. Standards
such as these might be imposed by a trial court on an ad hoc ba-
sis or more generally by an appellate court, or they might be
codified. And even in the absence of constraint, the defense
52 For example, the state might perform a laboratory test on material that disinte-
grates, through no fault of the state, before the accused has an opportunity to examine it.
53 These conditions are that the testimony be under oath, face-to-face with the ac-
cused, and subject to cross-examination. The Confrontation Clause also prescribes a rule
of preference: the testimony should be given at trial if reasonably possible.
54 Examination of this sort would ordinarily be feasible unless the child died or be-
came severely incapacitated after making the statement.
106 [82:89
The Child Quasi Witness
might adopt most of these guidelines as a matter of sound prac-
tice. Several excellent manuals and memoranda discuss good
practice in more depth than we do here.55
First, the examination should be conducted by a qualified
developmental-forensic interviewer, preferably one with ample
training in all relevant areas of developmental science, including
children's memory, perception, language, reasoning, emotional
development, and family dynamics. Ideally, the interview proto-
col should be empirically validated by professionals not associat-
ed with pro-defense or pro-prosecution advocacy organizations56
Second, the examiner ordinarily ought to be the only person
in the room with the child. If necessary, an adult with whom the
child is familiar may be in the room to comfort her and facilitate
the interview, but this individual should not unwittingly enforce
consistency. That is, if the adult is someone to whom the child
has already disclosed case-related information, then the adult's
presence in the room with the child could influence the child to
stick to her story, even if the child wants to recant it. In the ma-
jority of cases, if the interviewer and child become accustomed to
each other before the forensic interviewing starts, the need for a
support person would be greatly reduced.
Third, the interview ought to be video recorded. Child-
advocacy centers across the country routinely videotape
child-protective-service interviews in rooms that are outfitted
with audio-video equipment. Portions of the videotape may be
presented at trial as appropriate.
Fourth, the examiner should conduct the interview in such a
way that, while allowing her to attempt to determine and assess
the child's recollection of the events at issue, also attempts to
minimize the likely trauma to the child and tainting of the
child's memory.5 7
55 See, for example, Debra A. Poole and Michael E. Lamb, Investigative Interviews
of Children: A Guide for Helping Professionals 98-99 (American Psychological Associa-
tion 1998) (providing an interview protocol developed by researchers at the National In-
stitute of Child Health and Human Development).
56 A number of training programs that are affiliated with either pro-prosecution or
pro-defense organizations currently accredit or sponsor training workshops. The National
District Attorneys Association's National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse, for exam-
ple, has established training programs in many states. For one example, see ChildFirst
Pennsylvania: About Us (ChildFirst PA, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Q73T-MIXEJ.
57 The aim of a forensic interview is to collect the facts and their context. In con-
trast, a therapeutic interview may involve bringing to the surface suspected intrapsychic
conflicts. Techniques that may be valuable for therapeutic purposes (for example, play
therapy, role-playing, symbolic interpretation, and fostering self-empowerment) can cor-
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Fifth, a prosecutor and defense attorney, and the accused as
well, should have the opportunity to observe the interview as it
occurs, either through a one-way mirror or by video transmis-
sion to a nearby room. This would allow either party to seek in-
tervention if necessary and allow the other party to contest the
request. Ideally, a judicial officer would also be present with the
attorneys or able to observe a video transmission. At least, if
there is any concern that intervention may be necessary, a judi-
cial officer should be available by telephone.
Sixth, a party should be allowed to initiate intervention only
with the consent of the other party or by approval of the court.
Such interventions should be made only to protect the child or
ensure that the examination stays within proper bounds-
including time bounds, which may be determined previously.
Seventh, the examiner should be able to seek consultation
at any time with persons outside the room. This could be im-
portant if any significant problems arise, or if the examiner is in
doubt about whether the protocol prevents her from continuing
the examination in the way that she thinks is optimal.
IV. PRACTICAL ADVANTAGES OF THE QUASI-WITNESS MODEL
We have advocated the model presented here as a matter of
principle. Because some very young children lack the capacity to
be deemed witnesses, they should not testify at trial and the
Confrontation Clause should not apply to their statements, even
if those statements would clearly be deemed testimonial were
they made by an adult. Despite children's limitations, evidence
of their statements may be very probative, not unduly prejudi-
cial, and therefore worthy of admission. And basic fairness gives
the accused a right to examine the child out of court-as a
source of evidence rather than as a witness-by a qualified fo-
rensic examiner and pursuant to a predetermined protocol.
This quasi-witness model also offers several distinct practi-
cal advantages to the criminal-justice system as compared to the
prevailing model, in which the Confrontation Clause is assumed
to apply to all human beings.
First, under prevailing practice, if a child is deemed not
competent to testify at trial, an unfortunate lacuna is left open.
Either her prior statement is excluded, denying the trier of fact
rupt the child's recollection. Absent empirical validation, these techniques should be
avoided in a forensic interview.
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potentially valuable information, or it is admitted but the ac-
cused has no opportunity to examine her. If, however, any child
who cannot be made a witness at trial is treated as a quasi wit-
ness, then the lacuna disappears: Secondary proof of the child's
statement presumably could be admitted and fully vetted; the
Confrontation Clause would pose no barrier. Furthermore, the
accused would have a right to examine the child-not through
cross-examination by an attorney in open court, but through a
pretrial videotaped interview conducted by a qualified forensic
interviewer.
Thus, it would be plausible to maintain even a rather high
threshold for determining when a child may testify at trial. Such
a threshold does not mean either the loss of prosecution evidence
or a vacuum of rights for the accused; it simply means that the
child is treated under a different model for purposes both of pre-
senting the child's account and of allowing the accused to exam-
ine her. In either event, the prosecution ordinarily has the abil-
ity, so far as the Confrontation Clause is concerned, to present
the child's statement, and the accused has some right to exam-
ine the child.
Second, a related structural matter is that the availability of
the quasi-witness model offers a possible solution to the dilem-
ma whether, in determining if a statement is testimonial, a
court should assume that the hypothetical person whose antici-
pation is assessed is the same age as the speaker. If only chil-
dren above a given level of development may be considered wit-
nesses, and if that threshold is set rather high, it becomes less
odd, in the context of determining whether a particular state-
ment is testimonial, to ask what the expectations of a reasonable
adult would be. In other words, it becomes more plausible to
treat all children in either of two ways: as ordinary witnesses,
judged by the same standards as adults who are not severely
limited; or as not sufficiently developed to be treated as witness-
es at all.
Third, testifying in open court-which can be difficult for
anybody-can be especially traumatic for a young child, espe-
cially if she is being asked to make an accusation of someone
close to her.5< The Supreme Court has allowed children in some
cases to be examined at trial in a room with only the prosecutor
58 See Gail S. Goodman, et al, Testifying in Criminal Court: Emotional Effects on
Child Sexual Assault Victims, in 57 Monographs of the Society for Research in Child De-
velopment 6-7 (July 1992).
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and defense counsel present.5 9 But this procedure still involves
ordinary cross-examination, and it can be applied only if the tri-
al court determines on the basis of case-specific evidence that
the child would likely suffer trauma as a result of confronting
the accused.60 The quasi-witness model does not require a pre-
diction of trauma. It allows the child to make her statements,
and to be examined on behalf of the accused, in a private, com-
fortable setting. And it provides for a style of examination that
will tend to be much gentler on the child than is cross-
examination by an attorney.
Fourth, it is part of American juridical dogma that cross-
examination is beyond a doubt "the greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of truth."61 But for various reasons,
this is not true with respect to very young children. Cross-
examination by an attorney at trial is in fact a disastrously poor
method for ensuring truthful statements by young children.62 A
qualified developmental-forensic child interviewer operating in a
comfortable setting has a much better chance of eliciting infor-
mation that may raise doubts about the child's initial account
without causing undue emotional trauma to the child.
Fifth, under the practice prevailing in most states, the ac-
cused has a right to examine the child-if at all-only at the
time of trial, which may take place very long after the events at
issue. In many cases, the defense's request for pretrial access to
a child witness is not approved. Under the quasi-witness model,
examination would occur before trial, and usually there would
be no reason why it could not occur when events are relatively
fresh in the child's mind.
59 See generally Maryland v Craig, 497 US 836 (1990).
6o See id at 855-57.
61 John H. Wigmore, 5 Evidence § 1367 at 32 (Chadbourn rev ed 1974); Lilly v Vir-
ginia, 527 US 116, 124 (1999) (Stevens) (plurality), quoting California v Green, 399 US
149, 158 (1970) (quotation marks omitted).
62 See Zajac and Hayne, 9 J Experimental Psychology: Applied at 187 (cited in note
50) (concluding, on the basis of an experiment involving five- and six-year-olds in which
cross-examination "proved to be unsuccessful in discrediting inaccurate children (i.e.,
misled children questioned about false events) [and] decreased the accuracy of children
who were initially correct," that "cross-examination style questioning is inappropriate for
young children"); Rachel Zajac and Harlene Hayne, The Negative Effect of Cross-
Examination Style Questioning on Children's Accuracy: Older Children Are Not Immune,
20 Applied Cognitive Psychology 3, 4, 11 (2006) (finding that cross-examination reduced
accuracy "to a point where accuracy did not differ significantly from chance" with five-
and six-year-olds, and significantly even with nine- and ten-year-olds).
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CONCLUSION
The advantages that we have cited for a system that does
not bring very young children to court would be of little account
if our proposal were inconsistent with the accused's rights under
the Confrontation Clause. But given our view that very young
children should simply be deemed incapable of being witnesses
for purposes of the Clause, the Clause gives the accused no
rights with respect to those children. Even children too young to
be deemed witnesses may still be sources of useful evidence,
however, and if they are treated that way, fundamental fairness
requires that the accused be afforded a well-controlled right of
examination through a properly qualified expert. As compared
to the prevailing system, we believe that the one that we pro-
pose would yield more accurate factfinding, a more meaningful
right of examination for the accused, and more humane treat-
ment of young children.
